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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Zoe Renee Barham appeals from

probation condition under Idaho

Statement

Of The

Facts

Code

§

the district court’s determination not t0 strike a

20-221.

And Course Of The Proceedings

Zoe Renee Barham was not insured when she was involved
thereafter purchased an insurance policy

was convicted by a jury of felony insurance fraud under LC.
The

district court

sentenced

immediately

from Progressive Insurance, and then represented

Progressive that she purchased the policy before the accident.

177.)

in a car accident,

Barham

to a

(N0. 47241 PSI, pp. 3-4.1)

§ 41-293(1)(c).

uniﬁed term of ﬁve

t0

She

(No. 47241 R., p.

years, with

two years ﬁxed,

but suspended the sentence in favor of three years of probation. (No. 47241 R., pp. 224-28.) At
the sentencing hearing, the district court judge articulated the terms and conditions of probation,

including the ﬁfth condition in the Idaho Department of Correction Agreement of Supervision,

(No. 47241 5/21/19 Tr., p. 29, L. 13

I

consent to the search of

— p.

my

controlling authority conducted
I

hereby waive

my

Which

states:

person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and

other real property 0r structures

ofﬁcer.

32, L. 17),

owned or leased by me, or for Which I am the
by any agent 0f IDOC or a law enforcement

rights

under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho

constitution concerning searches.

(N0. 47241 R., p. 229).

Barham accepted

an obj ection t0 the condition quoted above,

1

Barham previously appealed

resolved in State

V.

Barham,

104.)

at least t0 the extent

it

would require her

“t0 submit

Docket No. 47241-2019 and that appeal was
Idaho _, 464 P.3d 314 (Idaho Ct. App., May 13 2020). This
this appeal with the record from Docket No. 47241-2019. (R., p.

_

Court augmented the record in

the terms and conditions 0f probation, but registered

in this case in

t0 searches

by any law enforcement

ofﬁcer.

Not probation
The

(N0. 47241 5/21/19 Tr., p. 35, Ls. 6-19.)

ofﬁcer, but law enforcement ofﬁcer.”

district court

entered the judgment 0n

May

22,

2019. (No. 47241 R., pp. 224-27.)

The

district court

2019 (No. 47241
0f 2019

then ordered restitution to the Idaho Department 0f Insurance in

R., pp. 234-35),

and entered ordered

(N0. 47241 R., pp. 260-61).

Progressive Insurance and that appeal

314 (Idaho

Ct. App.,

May

in State V.

Barham ﬁled

(R., pp.

condition 0f probation related to

38.)

She argued

partial transcript

that

it

it

it is

As

t0 Strike

from a motion

(R., p. 40); that “the special

both the Fourth

violates

17 0f the Idaho Constitution. (R., p.
delegates powers

it

§ 5, to all

needs exception

conducted purely by police ofﬁcers”

Barham “cannot be considered

free

Barham

to

the court t0 strike

law enforcement

“not reasonably related to the goals of probation” and

unconstitutional conditions doctrine” (R., p. 47).

2

§

Board of Corrections under Article X,

relates to searches

consent provided by

I,

it

violates the “nondelegation doctrines because

ofﬁcers in general” (R., p. 38); that

“overbroad and vague”

Barham asked

arguing that

U.S. Constitution, as well as Article

rightfully reserved t0 the

condition 5 as

searches,

Motion

from counsel attaching the

16-52), along with an afﬁdavit

suppress in an entirely unrelated criminal case (R., pp. 53-94).2

Amendment of the

_ Idaho _, 464 P.3d

Barham,

a Brief in Support of Defendant’s

judgment 0f conviction, the agreement of supervision, and a

the

the order of restitution t0

13 2020).

In October of 2019,

Condition of Probation

restitution to Progressive Insurance in July

Barham timely appealed from
was resolved

May 0f

.

.

.

is

does not apply t0

(R., p. 45);

or voluntary and

it

and

that the

violates the

clariﬁed, however, that she did “not

the district court later noted, though the brief was styled as in support of a motion, a motion

was never

ﬁled. (R., p. 111 n. 2.)

challenge this condition of probation as
direction of, an agent of IDOC,” but

seizures,

was challenging

and waivers 0f constitutional

The

state

relates to searches

it

rights Vis-a-Vis

and seizures by, 0r

the condition only “as

it

request 0r

relates t0 searches,

law enforcement ofﬁcers.”

(R., p. 38.)

responded that Barham was making a legal argument based 0n a purely

hypothetical possibility that the probation condition

would be used by police ofﬁcers without any

connection t0 the supervision of her probation, not a factually based motion t0
probation as permitted by Idaho
that Idaho case

at the

Code

law permits ofﬁcers

§ 20-221(2).

alter the

terms of

(Aug. R., pp. 2-3.3) Further, the state noted

to assist with searches related t0 the supervision

and Barham could address the propriety 0f any search

was

that

0f probation

allegedly unrelated to the

supervision of probation should such a search occur. (Aug. R., pp. 4-7.)

In a hearing

searches conducted

t0 searches

on the motion, Barham again emphasized

by or

0r fashion.”

Amendment

(Tr., p. 30, L.

was “not objecting

to

of a probation ofﬁcer,” but was instead objecting only

at the direction

conducted “by police ofﬁcers

that she

.

.

.

21 — p. 31, L.

With Probation and Parole not involved in any form

8.)

“[W]e’re not objecting to waiver 0f Fourth

rights in regards t0 probation ofﬁcers, searches

conducted by probation ofﬁcers,

only those searches conducted purely by police ofﬁcers Without any input or approval from
probation officers.” (TL, p. 3 1, Ls. 12-19.)

The

district court

held ﬁrst that

Barham

denied Barham’s motion in a written order. (R., pp. 105-29.) The court

failed to provide “facts constituting

good cause

for the

modiﬁcation 0f

probation under section 20-221,” as required by that statute, instead providing a purely legal

3

In an order dated April 28, 2020, this Court granted a motion t0 augment the record on appeal
With the State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion t0 Strike Condition of Probation, ﬁled

November

1,

2019.

argument regarding a hypothetical search unconnected t0 the supervision of her probation.
pp.

110-12

(emphasis original).)

Amendment

addressing Fourth

Second,

after

extensively reviewing Idaho’s

case

(R.,

law

waivers and consents to search included as conditions of

probation, the court recognized that Idaho’s appellate courts have repeatedly considered and

enforced probation conditions relevantly similar to the one

at issue here.

(R., pp. 112-28.)

The

court recognized that such a condition does not prevent a probationer from challenging a

particular search as

Barham could do
possibility

beyond the scope of What

is

permissible for the supervision of probation, that

so through a motion to suppress, and that Barham’s concern about the

of such a search was not good cause t0 modify her terms of probation.

mere

(R., pp. 112-

28.)

Barham timely appealed from
03.)

the district court’s order denying her motion. (R., pp. 100-

w
Barham

states the issues

on appeal

Did the

district court err

by denying Ms. Barham’s motion

her

probation

that

allowed

as:

warrantless,

t0 strike a condition

suspicionless

searches

by

of

law

enforcement?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Barham failed t0 show
Amendment waiver?

that district court

abused

its

discretion

by declining

to strike a Fourth

ARGUMENT
Barham Has Not Shown That The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Declining To
The Relevant Probation Condition
A.

Introduction

On

appeal, as below,

Barham argues

abused

that the district court

refusing “t0 strike the condition 0f her probation that waived her Fourth

respect t0 searches

0r

Strike

by law enforcement,” but not with respect

by law enforcement

at the direction

its

discretion

Amendment

to “searches

of probation ofﬁcers.” (Appellant’s

by

rights With

by probation ofﬁcers
brief, p. 8.)

That

is,

though n0 such search had occurred, she obj ected to the possibility 0f “searches conducted purely

by police ofﬁcers without any input or approval from probation
According

t0

Barham,

mere

that

possibility implies that the probation condition is not reasonably

related to the goals of probation.4

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.)

order, the district court correctly rejected that

Barham

In an thorough, well-reasoned

argument for two reasons.

(R., pp. 105-29.)

First,

did not support her request with an afﬁdavit stating facts showing that the probation

condition should be stricken as she

12.)

officers.” (TL, p. 31, Ls. 12-19.)

was required

to

d0 by Idaho Code

§

20-221(2). (R., pp. 110-

Second, Idaho courts have repeatedly upheld Virtually identical probation conditions as

ﬁthhering the purposes of probation and,

if

a particular search

was unreasonable

in light

purposes, she could and should address those concerns through a motion to suppress.

0f those
(R., pp.

112—29.)

4

She made other arguments below, including, for example,

separation of powers and

was not

abandoned them on appeal.

that the condition violated the

voluntarily consented t0 (R., pp. 38-52), but has apparently

Standard

B.

The

Code

§

Of Review

district court’s

20-221(2)

is

determination whether to modify a condition of probation under Idaho

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State

405 P.3d 567, 573-74 (2017).
whether the

trial court:

Under an abuse of

V.

Gibbs, 162 Idaho 782, 788-89,

discretion standard, this Court determines

“(1) correctly perceived the issue as

one of discretion;

(2) acted within the

outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal standards applicable t0 the

speciﬁc choices available to

Lunneborg

C.

V.

MV Fun Life,

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by

the exercise 0f reason.”

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

Barham Did Not Properly Support Her Motion Under Idaho Code

S

20-221

(2)

Idaho Code § 20-221(2) permits a probationer t0 “request t0 modify the terms and
conditions of probation” and provides that such a request “shall be supported

attested to

by a statement

under oath 0r signed under penalty of perjury pursuant to section 9-1406, Idaho Code,

setting for the facts

upon Which

the request

While her attorney did attach an afﬁdavit

is

based.”

Barham

did not submit such a statements

t0 the brief, the afﬁdavit

merely attached the judgment,

probation agreement, and a portion 0f a transcript from the motion t0 suppress in an unrelated

criminal case.

(R., pp. 53-54.)

facts relevant” to her

Barham concedes on appeal

argument that the probation condition was not reasonably related t0 the

purpose of probation. (Appellant’s

were no

‘facts

that this afﬁdavit did not “include

upon which

brief, p.

the request

7n.

4.)

was based’

The

district court

recognized that“[t]here

set forth in the Affidavit,”

and denied the

request in part 0n that basis. (R., pp. 110-12 (quoting LC. § 20-221(2)).)

5

Indeed, as the district court noted, she did not even ﬁle a motion. (R., p. 111 n. 2.)

On
new

appeal,

Barham argues

that the district court erred

0r additional facts previously

unknown

because she “was not asserting that

change in her

t0 the district court justiﬁed the

probation terms,” but was instead “continuing her objection from the sentencing hearing.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.) But that contention illustrates the problem With her motion below,

it

does not resolve or mitigate that problem. Barham was attempting t0 use Idaho Code § 20-221
(2) t0 press a purely legal challenge t0 the condition

and could have been pursued

at sentencing,

modiﬁcation of the terms 0f probation in
should have

made

necessary, then

0f probation, a challenge that was available

When

light

0f

the provision

new

is

intended to permit the

0r changed facts.

Barham could and

her argument regarding the condition of probation at sentencing and, if

on timely appeal from the entry of the judgment.

m

State V.

Gawron, 112 Idaho

841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987) (“If such a defendant [who believes that a condition of

probation

is

probation, he

unreasonable] desires t0 challenge the legality of any proposed conditions of

may d0

so 0n appeal from the judgment, or 0n habeas corpus.”).

Instead, she

registered an objection at sentencing but did not press the issue, did not appeal

judgment, and attempted to shoe-horn her argument into a motion under Idaho Code
Regardless, Idaho

Code

§

State V. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 726,

540, 261 P.3d 815, 817 (2011).

‘shall’

unambiguously indicates a mandatory requirement.

852 P.2d 87, 92 (1993); State

Barham does not

V. Peregrina,

151 Idaho 538,

dispute that she failed to satisfy that

requirement. The only case she cites for the proposition that the district court erred
request that did not satisfy a statutory requirement

1227

(Ct.

she cites

App. 2002). (Appellant’s
it

only because

it

§ 20-221(2).

20-221(2) states a requirement for a request for a modiﬁcation

The term

0f probation conditions.

from the

brief, p. 9.)

But

is

by denying a

State V. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 53 P.3d

that case provides

no support

at all.

In fact,

includes “no discussion of [the] afﬁdavit requirement.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.

A

9.)

case that does not address the requirement at

all

is

hardly support for the

proposition that a district court errs by denying requests that do not comply with

The

district court

it.

did not err by denying a request t0 modify her probation because that

request did not satisfy the requirements of the statute.

Even On The

D.

Barham Has Not Shown That The

Merits,

Abused

District Court

Its

Discretion

Even

setting aside her failure t0

court denied Barham’s request

comply With

0n the merits

and correctly applying the appropriate

the requirements 0f the statute, the district

after recognizing its decision as discretionary, citing

legal standards,

and engaging

an extensive and well-

in

reasoned analysis to reach the determination that there was n0 good cause t0 modify Barham’s
probation conditions.

(R., pp. 109-10, 112-28.)

abuse of discretion standard the

8.)

That fact alone

abused

its

is

discretion.

(2017) (warning that

E
it is

“the

facts

which prong of the

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-

show

State V. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 575 n.2,

that the district court

388 P.3d 583, 589 n.2

inadequate t0 cite the abuse of discretion standard and allege an abuse

Though she does not
that

identify

district court allegedly failed t0 satisfy.

sufﬁcient t0 conclude that she has failed t0

of discretion without identifying

claims

Barham does not

how precisely the

identify the

show

that

district court

abused

its

discretion).

prong of the abuse of discretion standard

the

condition

allowing

suspicionless

at issue,

searches

she

by law

enforcement was not reasonably related t0 the purpose 0f Ms. Barham’s rehabilitation.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

conviction

was her

Barham

ﬁrst felony and

cites the

was

destroying contraband or evidence

for

following facts as allegedly showing as much: her

an offense that did not involve “possessing, hiding, or

0f a crime”; she was determined by the presentence

investigator to be a

10W

risk t0 reoffend; she

had been sober

and a long-term residence.

children, a stable relationship,

the district court

was aware of all 0f this information

because 0f

(No. 47241 5/21/19 Tr., p. 19, L. 9

considered

it.

it

Barham probation

p. 22, L. 7.)

The

district court

then

did not provide good cause to do so.

the district court recognized,

it is

important t0 note that

requesting that she be free of searches while she

Barham was

—

Of course,

again in the context of Barham’s motion t0 modify her probation conditions and

it

reasonably determined that

As

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

sentencing and granted

at

and she had

for over seven yearsg6

was not objecting

explicit that she

Barham

Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (“Ms.

ofﬁcers

0r

by law enforcement

acknowledges

that the Fourth

probation to the extent that

it

at

t0 searches

Barham does not
the

direction

Amendment waiver

not suggesting 0r

on supervised probation.”

is

p. 30, L.

21 —

take issue with searches

0f probation ofﬁcers”).)

is

(R., p.

112.)

by probation ofﬁcers, or by law

enforcement With “input 0r approval from probation ofﬁcers.” (TL,

ﬂ alﬂ

“is

p. 31, L. 23;

by probation

Barham

So,

reasonably related t0 the purposes of

authorizes searches performed

by 0r

in consultation with a

probation ofﬁcer, even given the facts cited above—e.g., her lack of prior felonies, the fact that

she has children,

etc.

But she argues

that the

mere

possibility that

law enforcement might

attempt to use the condition t0 justify a search not performed in consultation with a probation

ofﬁcer implies that

it is

not reasonably relate to the purposes of probation. Thus, While

frames her argument in terms of the facts cited above, they play n0 substantial role in
effectively arguing that the condition, as a per se matter,

6

is

it.

Barham
She

is

not reasonably related t0 the goals 0f

Barham reported not using heroin in over seven years, but was currently in treatment for
“Opioid Use Disorder, severe,” for abuse 0f prescription opioids. (No. 47241 PSI, pp. 17-18,
159-60.)

10

probation because

it

might license searches that are not appropriately connected

to her probation

ofﬁcer.

The

district court correctly rejected that position.

First,

on Barham’s View, the

distinction

between an acceptable search by a police ofﬁcer

and an unacceptable one hinges 0n whether the police ofﬁcer received “input” from a probation
ofﬁcer.

(Tr., p. 30, L.

21

—

p. 31, L. 23.)

According

t0

Barham,

it

ﬁthhers the purposes of

probation t0 permit a police ofﬁcer t0 conduct a search if the police ofﬁcer ﬁrst brieﬂy talks by

phone with her probation ofﬁcer, but
ofﬁcer

is

aware of her

it

does not serve the purpose of probation

status as a probationer, has the

Second, the

district

same

same information, conducts the search with

the intent of enforcing her probation conditions, but does not

Barham provides n0 explanation why that would be

if the

make

that brief

phone

call ﬁrst.

so.

court recognized that Idaho’s appellate courts have repeatedly

enforced probation conditions that extend authority t0 “any law enforcement ofﬁcer” to conduct
searches or t0 seize the probationer.

(R., pp. 112-28.)

In State V.

Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736

P.2d 1295 (1987), for example, the Court considered a Virtually identical probation condition
authorizing searches “by any law enforcement officer,” and appellant argued that the condition
constituted “an unreasonable invasion of his fourth

at

1296-97.

The Court recognized

conditions, that the condition

conditions, that a defendant

is

“who

amendment

that district courts

rights.”

Li

E

at

842-43, 736 P.2d

have broad discretion to impose probation

necessary to ensure compliance With the other probation
considers the conditions 0f probation too harsh”

them, and that probationers have a reduced expectation of privacy.
the probation condition.

Li

alﬂ

State V.

Li.

may

reject

The Court then enforced

Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208-10, 207 P.3d 182,

184-86 (2009) (holding that probation condition that extended to “any law enforcement ofﬁcer”

11

permitted police ofﬁcer t0 seize probationer Without suspicion);

Samson

V. California,

843, 846-56 (2006) (holding that parole condition consenting t0 searches

at

some point attempt

district court

to justify

does not imply that there

is

ofﬁcers conduct a search that

recognized that the mere possibility that ofﬁcers might

an unreasonable search by reference to

good cause
is

by “parole ofﬁcer or

Amendment).

other peace offer” did not Violate Fourth

Second, though, the

547 U.S.

t0 strike the condition.

not reasonable,

this

probation condition

(R., pp. 112, 127-28.)

Barham could

Instead, if

press the issue in a motion to

suppress that would permit the district court to address the issue in the context 0f the facts

surrounding that search.

waivers like the one

The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized

at issue

here “do not eviscerate Fourth

scales 0f the reasonableness analysis.”

(2019).

As

State V.

Amendment

rights,

454 P.3d

at

Amendment

they only

may ﬁnd

that a search

the fruits 0f the search, just as did the Court in Ma_Xim.

550 (suppressing evidence and holding “that a Fourth Amendment waiver

cannot salvage an otherwise unreasonable entry into a

home under

the Fourth

Amendment

police ofﬁcers were unaware 0f the waiver at the time of the unconstitutional search”).

does not contend that she was in fact subject to an unreasonable search.
ﬁxture, she

on the probation condition

imply that the condition

Even

is

in

Barham

does so in the

an attempt to justify an unreasonable search does not

now not reasonably related to

the purposes of probation.

setting aside her procedural failing below, the district court reasonably

Barham did not provide good cause

shown that

If she

if the

can press the issue in a motion t0 suppress. The mere possibility that ofﬁcers might in

the future rely

that

tip the

Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 907, 454 P.3d 543, 549

a result, and notwithstanding a waiver like that here, a court

was unreasonable and so may suppress
Li. at 908,

that Fourth

the district court abused

its

t0 strike the relevant probation condition.

discretion.
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concluded

She has not

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment of the

district court.

17th day of July, 2020.
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